Abstract. The PKCS#11 standard describes an API for cryptographic operations which is used in scenarios where cryptographic secrets need to be kept secret, even in case of server compromise. It is widely deployed and supported by many hardware security modules and smart cards. A variety of attacks in the literature illustrate the importance of a careful configuration, as API-level attacks may otherwise extract keys.
Introduction
The more complex a system is, the more difficult is assuring its security. Given the complexity of the runtime environment provided by multi-purpose computers, it appears reasonable to compute security-critical operations outside the computer that actually runs the protocol (and usually more than one protocol), and instead on a device which is a) smaller, and thus more amenable to verification, and b) designed with security in mind. In security-critical contexts, e. g., the cash machine network or the public key infrastructure, the use of such devices, so-called security tokens, is common practice. In case the (complex) system running the protocol is under adversarial control, i. e., in case of server compromise, cryptographic secrets are protected by the (smaller, and thus more secure) security token, and the fact that these secrets were never directly accessible, even to the server.
PKCS#11 defines a platform-independent API to security tokens, for example smart cards, but also hardware security modules (HSMs). HSMs are physical computing devices that can be attached directly to a server via Ethernet, USB or other services, providing logical and physical protection for sensitive information and algorithms. Clulow's attack. It was discovered very soon that a faithful implementation of the standard violates this property. Clulow showed the following attack in 2003 [8] , which serves as an introduction to the caveats in the design of PKCS#11. Keys are accessed via handles, hence indirectly. Some may be used for encryption and/or decryption, therefore an attacker that can access the token (e. g., in case of server compromise) can request the encryption of some message he supplies with a key of his choice, given that he knows the handle (which we will consider public) and that the key is configured to allow for encryption by setting an attribute 'encrypt' to true, analogously for decryption. Similarly, it is possible to wrap a key k 1 with another key k 2 , that is, encrypt k 1 under k 2 . This allows for backup, as well as for transfer. Given that k 2 is present on two security tokens A and B, one may wrap k 1 with k 2 on A (using two handles associated with k 1 and k 2 , respectively) and unwrap the resulting cypher-text on B, using another handle to k 2 . The scenario where k 2 is configured for wrapping and for decryption permits the attacker to request a wrapping of k 1 under k 2 and then decrypt the resulting cyphertext, thus obtaining the value of k 1 in the plain. The attack also applies when k 2 is wrapped under itself.
An 'incomplete' implementation of the standard, often called a configuration can thwart this attack by forbidding the same key to be used for wrapping and decryption. But there are other conflicts, e. g., between encryption and unwrapping. In the present paper, we propose a configuration and a method for verifying its security. We focus on attacks on the logical level, using only API calls that are (by themselves) perfectly harmless, as opposed to attacks on the implementation of cryptographic functionality [4] .
Related Work. Building on the work of Longley and Rigby [20] and Bond and Anderson [5] on API attacks, several recent papers have investigated the security of APIs on the logical level adapting symbolic techniques for protocol analysis [6, 9, 11] , finding many new attacks. There have also been academic proposals for new APIs [19, 10, 18] . While many attacks were found, a lot of effort was directed towards finding configurations that are secure, i. e., that preserve secrecy of keys.
In the analysis of PKCS#11 configurations, there are three major lines of work. The first one uses protocol verification techniques, regarding the security token as the (sole) participant in a protocol, with the adversary sending requests on the public network. Early results by Delaune, Kremer and Steel translated a given configuration into a satisfiability problem which is solved by model checking, providing secrecy of keys if the number of keys is known in advance [11] . This restriction was lifted in later work [14] by Fröschle and Steel, showing that a class of configurations can safely be abstracted by configurations that are static (i. e., a key's attribute cannot be changed) and showing that the latter is soundly over-approximated in a bounded model. This method is used in further work by Bortolozzo, Centenaro, Focardi and Steel to find attacks on security tokens using automatic reverse engineering and to show a configuration very similar to ours secure.
